

CWA

- quality - human consumption "potable"
- fishable / swimmable
- organic effluent
 - Volatile Organic Compounds
 - nitrates - detergents
 - fertilizer
 - pesticides
- ag runoff
- muni sewage
- heated water

- biochemical oxygen demand (BOD)
 - effluent → dissolved oxygen
- eutrophication - dead lake
- point source - identify source
 - regulate source
 - toxic materials
- non-point source
 - shared responsibility

- receiving water (where pollution goes)
quality / quantity affect regs
re emissions
- Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Castle D.C. 1978
discharge into Pacific Ocean
"dilution is the solution to
pollution"
ruled against W.

- least cost avoider principle
 - if cost of cleaning effluent is less than cleaning water for use \rightarrow clean up effluent
- penalties \rightarrow damages - restore injured party
 - \rightarrow punitive - to make up for incomplete prosecution

EV Losses ($P_L \cdot \#L$)


EV Damage Award \uparrow $\#L$ awards
 ($P_P \cdot P_L \cdot \#L$)

CAA

- NAAQS → offsets in non-attainment areas - market mechanism

Project 88 - Wirth (CO)
Heinz (PA)

Acid Rain Trading Program



Emission Trading SO_2 - Crocker
- Dales

- heterogeneous producers of emissions

Low cost \rightarrow High Cost of emission

- if set uniform standard - reduce by
X% - HC spend a lot LC less

If allow trade HC buy emission rights
LC sell

Issue permits (emit 1 Ton of SO_2)
allow trade - CBOT

Area → NAAQS -

permits - site specific

- banked (risk reduction)

2 constraints - permit

- using permit does not
allow exceeding NAAQS
for region

3 firms

A \$20 / ton 70 tons
 B \$25 / ton 80 tons
 C \$10 / ton 50 tons

200


Std set at 120 - command → no trade

Cost A 30 · 20 = \$600

B 40 · 25 = 1000

C 10 · 10 = 100

1700



Price of permit \$20

C sells to B

$$B_{WTP} = 25$$

$$C_{WTA} = 10$$

B buy C's permits C gets \$800
 C pay \$500 to abate
 50 tons ↓ abate
 at \$10/ton

$$B \text{ save } 40 \times 5 = \$200$$

Issues

- initial allocation level
 - how? - shares?
 - prior emissions?
- irreversible production choices
 - uncertainty re price of permits
- heterogeneity among firms trading.